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COMMENT
PERSONHOOD AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PURITAN
COVENANT: CAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
DICTATE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITIONS?
Paul M. Brodersent
I. INTRODUCTION
The theological premise of Christianity is that man is made in the image
of an almighty God, that we are fearfully and wonderfully made, and that
we were knit together in our mother's womb. This theological premise
reemphasizes a simple yet profound philosophical idea-that which is
observable, namely life, can never be held less important or of less value
than that which is unobservable, namely the value of nonexistence.! In
general, when weighing the value of life against the value of nonexistence,
life should prevail; and in some instances, the Supreme Court agrees.' The
idea that human life has intrinsic value is not foreign to the foundation of
American constitutional jurisprudence.' Indeed, inalienable rights were
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1. Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1122 (Md. App. 2002) ("'measuring the value of
an impaired life as compared to nonexistence is a task that is beyond mortals') (quoting
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979)).
2. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) ("[O]ur decisions lead us to
conclude that the asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Constitution also requires,
however, that Washington's assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate
government interests . . . . This requirement is unquestionably met here.") (citations
omitted).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that persons shall not be "deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1
(guaranteeing that states shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law"); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold
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enumerated at the dawn of America.' The fact that the legal recognizance or
respect of some inalienable rights has deteriorated demonstrates the need
for a national personhood amendment and similar state amendments that
recognize the pre-existing and inalienable right to life. Such a standard
would set forth a principled position regarding the protection of human life
at all stages of biological development.
The Preamble to the United States Constitution identifies a primary
purpose to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."'
Ideally, the Constitution would be interpreted as the Puritan Covenant it
was intended to be.6 Early American colonization is replete with references
to the importance of the divine covenants that communities would make
between each other and with their God.! Indeed, "[wlithout some
understanding of Puritanism, it may safely be said, there is no
understanding of America."
This Comment posits that higher principles of law, namely, certain
inalienable' rights, govern the Great American Puritan Covenant, otherwise
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.").
4. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
5. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
6. It is necessary here to briefly define what is meant by a Puritan Covenant. The
foundation of American constitutionalism dates back as early as 1578 when Sir Humphrey
Gilbert chartered under the Letters Patent, which "required that the colonists pledge loyalty
to the Crown, but left the design for local government to the settlers, so long as local law was
not contrary to the laws of England." Don S. Lutz, Religious Dimensions in the Development
of American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 21, 23 (1990). Additionally, the Protestants
took with them the model of church covenants wherever they went, and the same model is
seen in the Mayflower Compact of 1620. Id. "To the Puritans, the social covenant was a
human need and, above all, a divine destiny. God had called them to build His society and
carry out His plan of salvation in the New World." Fernando Rey Martinez, The Religious
Character of the American Constitution: Puritanism and Constitutionalism in the United
States, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 459, 468 (2002-2003).
7. See Martinez, supra note 6, at 468-70; Lutz, supra note 6, at 24.
8. PERRY MILLER & THOMAS H. JOHNSON, THE PURITANS: A SOURCEBOOK OF THEIR
WRITINGS 1 (2001).
9. The terms "inalienable" and "unalienable" can be used interchangeably, as both
carry the same meaning. Thomas Kindig, Unalienable/Inalienable, USHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/unalienable.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
Nevertheless, it is generally preferable in modern English writing to use inalienable except
when directly citing the Declaration of Independence. See BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S
MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 451 (3d ed. 2009). Inalienable will thus be used in this Comment.
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known as the Constitution. Moreover, the inalienable rights expressed in
the country's articles of incorporationo are exactly what they claim to be-
inalienable. The recognition of inalienable rights is merely enumerating, or
perhaps more accurately, remembering or distinguishing something that
already exists and that has been forgotten through judicial action." Section
II of this Comment provides a background on the importance of defining
the term person in various constitutional texts. Section III describes the
problems prevalent when the term person is defined inaccurately or
exclusive of certain human beings. Finally, Section IV describes the solution
of enumerating the existing inalienable right to life in state constitutions
and the federal Constitution. Additionally, Section IV outlines why this
avenue is constitutionally feasible with recent Supreme Court precedent
upholding the principle of federalism. This Comment discusses how various
failures by the Supreme Court to define personhood have ended
disastrously 2 and explains why a personhood amendment, both a federal
amendment and similar state amendments, is foreseeable and necessary.
Finally, this Comment provides a review of prominent American historical
records and reveals why the confusion in case precedent on the issue of life
necessitates the need for a clear, enumerated explanation of the inalienable
right to life for all humans.
10. The relationship between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution can
best be described as analogous to a corporation's Articles of Incorporation and its By-Laws.
DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION 247 (4th ed.
2005). The Articles call the corporation into existence and the By-Laws explain how to
govern the corporation. The Articles are not replaced by the corporation's By-Laws, but they
are guided by them. Likewise, the Declaration of Independence called America into
existence, and the Constitution explains how to govern America. The Declaration has never
been regarded as replaced or disannulled. Samuel Adams stated that "[b]efore the formation
of this Constitution . . .. [tihis Declaration of Independence was received and ratified by all
the States in the Union, and has never been disannulled." 4 SAMUEL ADAMS, THE WRITINGS
OF SAMUEL ADAMS 357 (New York G. P. Putnam's Sons 1908) (1794).
11. Speaking of two different decisions resulting in judicial legislation, "each represents
an act of judicial aggrandizement: a transfer of power to judges from the political branches of
government-and thus, ultimately, from the people themselves." J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of
Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009).
12. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 918 (2000) (permitting the killing of unborn
children moments before birth); see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205-07 (1927)
(permitting the sterilization of what the State considered "feeble minded" persons, thereby
implying the status of such individuals is somewhat less than a full person with
constitutional rights); see also C. Ann Potter, Will the "Right to Die" Become a License to Kill?
The Growth of Euthanasia in America, 19 J. LEGIS. 31, 47 (1993) (comparing Euthanasia to
Nazi Germany).
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Perhaps a state or federal constitutional amendment will challenge the
Supreme Court to reevaluate its disrespect of higher principles of law held
inalienable by our Founding Fathers. A Supreme Court decision on a state
or federal personhood constitutional amendment could answer the question
whether nine unelected Justices employed by the federal government can
dictate state constitutional definitions, and more specifically, whether the
United States Supreme Court is willing to recognize the inalienable right to
life without drawing ambiguous lines as to where life begins. The biological
science is clear on when life begins, and the law should also be clear on the
starting point of the only inalienable right that no American can live
without-life."
II. BACKGROUND
The definition of personhood is paramount in legal dialogue regarding
constitutional law and jurisprudence specifically regarding the sanctity of
life.14 Several attempts to define personhood pervade history" and continue
to this very day.16
13. 42 AM. JUR. 2DInfants § 3 (2011).
[Bliologically speaking, the life of a human being begins at the moment of
conception in the mother's womb, and as a general rule of construction in law,
a legal personality is imputed to an unborn child for all purposes which are
beneficial to the infant after his or her birth. Under this view, viability does not
affect the legal existence of the unborn, and it would be a most unsatisfactory
criterion, since it is a relative matter, depending on the health of the mother
and child and many other matters in addition to the stage of development.
Id.
14. See Gregory J. Roden, Unborn Children as Constitutional Persons, 25 ISSUES L. &
MED. 185, 187-91 (2010); Potter, supra note 12, at 46-47; Gregory J. Roden, Prenatal Tort
Law and the Personhood of the Unborn Child: A Separate Legal Existence, 16 ST. THOMAs L.
REv. 207, 270 (2003).
15. See generally Raymond B. Marcin, God's Littlest Children and the Right to Live: The
Case for a Positivist Pro-Life Overturning of Roe, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 38 (2008)
(arguing that defining personhood must be accomplished through legal positivism); Esther
Zimmerman, Legal Rights of Unborn Children Injured in the Workplace, II J. Juv. L. 88, 89
(1990) (noting the majority rule that a viable fetus "may maintain a separate civil action for
personal injury"); The Fetus as a Legal Entity-Facing Reality, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 126, 126
(1970).
16. Hughes v. Hosemann, No. 251-10-546 (Cir. Ct. 1st Jud. Dist. Hinds Cnty., Miss. Oct.
26, 2010) (denying the plaintiffs' motion to prevent an Initiative that attempted to define the
term person in the Mississippi State Constitution from being delivered to the legislature for
placement on the election ballot); Complaint, Hughes v. Hosemann, No. 251-10-546 (Cir.
Ct. 1st Jud. Dist. Hinds Cnty. Miss. July 6, 2010) (initiating suit by the ACLU and Planned
382 [Vol. 6:379
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References throughout the founding documents to the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God provide a legal foundation for the American
experiment." Along with the right to liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness, the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence
enumerate a fundamental and inalienable right that no human can live
without-the right to life for all persons." Therefore, defining the term
person in the Constitution for purposes of legal rights is essential for the
sole purpose of reiterating the inalienable right to life that pre-existed the
Constitution.
A. Defining Personhood in the Constitutional Covenant
The purpose stated in the Preamble of the Constitution is to "secure the
blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."19 Posterity, however, is
not defined in the Constitution, and the persons to whom the term
posterity pertains is of the utmost importance. Since the Constitution and
the Declaration of Independence are the nation's founding documents, both
should be examined before attempting to define personhood.
The Declaration uses the term people ten times relating to several rights
and grievances.20 Additionally, the Constitution references the terms person
or persons forty-nine separate times.2 1 Defining a term correctly when
referencing it continually throughout the supreme law of the land is
critical.22 Only two conclusions logically follow from the absence of a
specific definition of person in the Constitution-either the founding
fathers believed the term had already been defined, either explicitly or
implicitly, or they thought an enumerated definition was unnecessary. Each
possible conclusion is addressed in turn.
Parenthood attempting to prevent the Mississippi Personhood initiative from being placed
on the ballot).
17. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776).
19. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
20. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2, 5 (twice), 7, 8, 12, 26, 30, 32 (U.S.
1776).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 3, art. IV, § 2, amends. IV, V,
XII, XIV, XX, XXII.
22. Id.
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1. The definition of a constitutional person already exists and simply
needs further clarification through enumeration.
Several references in the founding documents refer to certain inalienable
rights and several enumerated rights, but little attention is directed to whom
those rights pertain.23 Such references in the nation's founding documents,
like the Declaration of Independence, could substantiate the claim that
beneficiaries of these rights need only satify the requirement of being a
human being." One scholar" remarks that
the rights were invested in human beings as a class, so that no
one who satisfied the criterion "human" was to be excluded from
having the rights and having them secured by government.
Conversely, those beings in the world such as animals and plants
did not share this unique and high status of rights, or protection
of rights.26
The numerous references to the terms person, persons, or people
throughout the Declaration and the Constitution must refer to humanity.
The Declaration states that "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness."27 Therefore, expanding the term human to include
men, person, or persons is a reasonable inference.2 8
23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
24. H. Wayne House, Influence of the Natural Law Theology of the Declaration of
Independence on the Establishment of Personhood in the United States Constitution, 2 LIBERTY
U. L. REV. 725, 729 (2008).
25. Id. at 725. H. Wayne House is a distinguished research Professor of Biblical and
Theological Studies at Faith Evangelical Seminary (Tacoma, WA) and Adjunct Professor of
Law at Trinity Law School of Trinity International University. He is the New Testament
editor of the Nelson Study Bible and Nelson Illustrated Bible Commentary and the General
Editor of Evangelical Exegetical Commentary, has received a Certificate in International
Human Rights, Institut International des Droits de I'Homme, Strasbourg, France; J.D.,
Regent University School of Law; Th.D., Concordia Seminary; M.A., Abilene Christian
University; M.A., M.Div., Western Conservative Baptist Seminary; B.A. Hardin-Simmons
University.
26. Id. at 729.
27. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
28. Another issue to consider is the order of importance of the inalienable rights
mentioned. Perhaps listing these rights was specific and intentional. Indeed, one's pursuit of
happiness should never override another's liberty, and one's claim to liberty should never
override another's inalienable right to exist-the right to life.
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The Constitution establishes a protection of the rights that the
Declaration defines as inalienable in the Preamble," the Fifth
Amendment,3 0 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.3 1 The
founding fathers may have believed the terms person or persons to be
implicitly defined by several references to the inalienable right to life and
the Constitution's purpose to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity."3 2 Black's Law Dictionary defines posterity as "[fiuture
generations collectively . .. [or] . . . [a]ll the descendants of a person to the
furthest generation."33 If posterity includes all generations of people, and
the Declaration and the Constitution set out an inalienable and
fundamental right to life, then perhaps the constitutionally protected
persons were positively identified as the future generations of unborn
persons since the beginning of the country. Even if this is the case-that
constitutional jurisprudence has forgotten that the right to life is
inalienable-perhaps enumerating the existing inalienable right to life is
precisely the reminder America needs.
2. An enumerated definition of "person" should not be necessary,
except to correct incorrect interpretations of the covenant.
Alternatively, it is possible that an enumerated definition of personhood
was not deemed necessary due to the obvious nature of the inalienable right
to exist. An inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
applies to all constitutional persons. Scientifically, a person is a human
being from the beginning of biological development until natural death.34
29. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (stating the purpose is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity") (emphasis added).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating, "nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law").
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
32. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
33. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1285 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "posterity").
34. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 3(2011).
[Bliologically speaking, the life of a human being begins at the moment of
conception in the mother's womb, and as a general rule of construction in law,
a legal personality is imputed to an unborn child for all purposes which are
beneficial to the infant after his or her birth. Under this view, viability does not
affect the legal existence of the unborn, and it would be a most unsatisfactory
criterion, since it is a relative matter, depending on the health of the mother
and child and many other matters in addition to the stage of development.
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Thus, defining the term person or persons could be considered restating the
obvious.35 It was not until this inalienable right was threatened by various
United States Supreme Court decisions that the need arose to make known
the existing definition of person. 6 Several state initiatives, bills, referenda,
and the national Personhood Amendment movement are attempts to
reiterate an inalienable right that pre-existed the Constitution.37
3. Personhood initiatives and state constitutions as a source of rights
Several movements to amend state constitutions to define personhood
are prevalent throughout the United States.3 1 "There is a powerful
educational component to the Personhood Amendment . . . [such an
amendment] would present the opportunity to expose the truth about the
unborn child . . . not only [for] thousands who have assisted in the
procedure, but [to] all conscientious Americans."" The idea behind these
state initiatives is that if enough state amendments pass, growing support to
pass a national amendment to reiterate the inalienable right to life may
prevail."
Id.; see also Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that Life Begins at
Conception, 43 STAN. L. REv. 599, 599 n.1 (1991).
35. This author asserts that it is very important to emphasize that such an amendment
would not create a right to life, but merely reiterate a pre-existing inalienable right thwarted
by misinterpretation. Legal positivism and inalienable rights are mutually exclusive. Indeed,
if rights like life and liberty are truly inalienable, one cannot create such rights through legal
positivism. If these rights are inalienable, it does not matter whether society ignored their
existence. By nature, an inalienable right pre-exists any attempt to create or define that right
through legislation or the amendment process. Recognizing an inalienable right that has
been ignored is different than attempting to create a right through legal positivism.
36. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973), Justice Blackmun referenced the
Fourteenth Amendment regarding abortion and noted that if the unborn child has due
process rights, then the "appellant's case, of course, collapses."
37. See Federal Human Personhood Amendment, AMERICAN LIFE LEAGUE,
http://www.all.org/upload/2010/03/08/FHPA(final).pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2012); S.B. 335
(Ala. 2010); S.B. 2795 (Miss. 2007); Constitutional Initiative 26 (Miss. 2010); Constitutional
Initiative 100 (Mont. 2008); S.B. 406, 61st Leg. (Mont. 2009); Constitutional Initiative 102
(Mont. 2010); H.R. 3213, 116th Leg. (S.C. 2006); H.R. 3526, 118th Leg. (S.C. 2010);
Referendum 6 (S.D. 2006); Initiative Measure 11 (S.D. 2008).
38. See referenda and legislation cited supra note 37.
39. Memorandum from Liberty Counsel 10 (2009), available at
http://lc.org/media/9980/attachments/memo-ms-personhood.pdf.
40. Personhood USA advocates that it "intend[s] to build the support of at least two
thirds of the states in an effort to reaffirm personhood within the U.S. Constitution." About
Us, PERSONHOOD USA, http://www.personhoodusa.com/about (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
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The attempt to protect this right through the avenue of state
constitutions is currently relevant and useful. In fact, it is also recognized by
United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan,' who is considered
to be one of the more liberal Justices in history.42 Indeed, Justice Brennan's
"judicial works . . . clearly convey a definite political stance. The stance is
that of a true political liberal."43 Justice Brennan subscribes to the view of an
evolving Constitution." He makes an important admission, however, by
claiming that individual state constitutions are providing more protection
to individuals through the provisions of the states' Bill of Rights than the
United States Constitution. 45 Defining person to include the unborn,
elderly, and infirm is consistent with the current trend of the sovereign
attempting to amend state constitutions.' In another article, Justice
Brennan proposed that the Florida courts remind the electorate "that when
their state court's decisions rest only on state constitutional grounds,
citizens have the power 'to amend state law to insure rational law
enforcement.' 4 One could argue that this places an affirmative duty on the
sovereign to amend state law to ensure the legal recognition of inalienable
rights previously thwarted by misinterpretation.
Additionally, former New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart Pollock
reiterated the dual sovereignty existing in the United States as a basis for
justifying state action to expand personal rights in state constitutions. 48 He
stated that "[a]lthough federal courts may interpret a state constitution, the
final word on the meaning of that constitution is for the court of last resort
in that state," and if a "state court of last resort predicates a decision on an
independent state ground, the United States Supreme Court, as a general
rule, will not review that decision."4 9 The states have the final word on
interpretation of their state constitutions and the determination of the
41. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
42. Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in William
J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1991).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Brennan, supra note 41.
46. See Referendum 6 (S.D. 2006).
47. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 550 (1986).
48. Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REv. 707, 709 (1983).
49. Id.
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terms contained in them. Such a conclusion, mixed with an abrogation of
an inalienable right, delineates a duty for the sovereign to amend the state
constitution to prevent repeated denial of a fundamental, inalienable right.
History has shown that when the sovereign is silent about the abrogation of
an inalienable right, other fundamental rights suffer the same fate.so
Such was the case in Mississippi, when silence about the abrogation of
the inalienable right to life nearly caused another fundamental right, the
right to vote, to be infringed upon by organizations like Planned
Parenthood and the ACLU, who attempted to prevent the public from
voting on a Personhood initiative."' Indeed, both Justice Brennan and
Justice Pollock recognized the importance of state constitutions as sources
to identify fundamental rights,s2 and the recent case in Mississippi is proof
that when one inalienable right suffers, more are vulnerable to attack.53 The
Mississippi State Constitution contains a provision whereby its citizens can
propose a constitutional amendment by an initiative and referendum
process for the purpose of placing it on the ballot for a public vote.
Nevertheless, because of Mississippi's unfortunate, racially-discriminatory
history, the Mississippi Constitution also contains an amendment to
prevent this initiative process from being used "[flor the proposal,
modification or repeal of any portion of the Bill of Rights of [the]
Constitution."5 5
The initiative and referendum process is not the only way to amend the
Mississippi Constitution.5 6 In fact, the Mississippi Code defines the term
"person" elsewhere." Nevertheless, the initiative and referendum process is
50. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923, 945-46 (2000) (rejecting the right to
prohibit admittedly gruesome and dangerous medical procedures like late-term abortion);
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927) (rejecting the right to be free from arbitrary
sterilization); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403-04 (1856) (rejecting the right for
African-Americans to be recognized as constitutional citizens).
51. Hughes v. Hosemann, No. 251-10-546 (Cir. Ct. 1st Jud. Dist. Hinds Cnty., Miss. Oct.
26, 2010) (denying motion for judgment on the pleadings).
52. See Brennan, supra note 47, at 550; Pollock, supra note 48, at 709.
53. See Hughes v. Hosemann, No. 251-10-546 (Cir. Ct. 1st Jud. Dist. Hinds Cnty., Miss.
Oct. 26, 2010).
54. MIss. CONST. art. XV, § 273, cl. 3.
55. Id. at cl. 5(a).
56. MIss. CODE ANN. § 23-17-1. This section of the Mississippi Code defines how
electors may initiate proposed amendments to the Mississippi Constitution and provides yet
another way for the sovereign to change the constitutional covenant between the people. Id.
57. Id. § 23-17-47(b).
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a way the sovereign can use one fundamental right-voting-to directly
affect and protect another fundamental and inalienable right-the right to
exist. Although several states can amend state constitutions by the initiative
and referendum process," this Comment uses Mississippi as a guide for a
current case study on the process.s9
In Kean v. Clark, the District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi recognized the ballot initiative process in Mississippi. 6 This
case, regarding the adoption and background of ballot initiatives, provides a
foundation for understanding the ballot initiative process. 6' To this day,
Mississippi continues to preserve the sovereign's right to amend its State
constitution through ballot initiatives. 62  Despite the fact that the
enumerated right to the ballot initiative process encompasses the
fundamental right to vote, the ACLU and Planned Parenthood sought to
deny Mississippi citizens the right to vote on a Personhood ballot
initiative.6' This infringement of one fundamental right-namely the right
to vote-may act as a dangerous catalyst to the proverbial "domino effect"
that could lead to the infringement of all fundamental rights.
58. States that do so by constitutional initiative are Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts (indirect, which means the initiatives are
submitted to the legislature for action), Michigan, Mississippi (indirect), Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. States that
do so by statutory initiative are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Maine (indirect), Massachusetts (indirect), Michigan (indirect), Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada (indirect), North Dakota, Ohio (indirect), Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah (direct and indirect), Washington (direct and indirect), and Wyoming. See
Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century: Final Report and Recommendations of the
NCSL I&R Task Force, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 1, 63, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18231.
59. Constitutional Initiative 26 (Miss. 2010).
60. Kean v. Clark, 56 F. Supp. 2d 719, 734 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
61. Id. at 722.
62. Constitutional Initiative in Mississippi A Citizen's Guide, SECRETARY OF STATE,
http://www.sos.ms.gov/links/elections/home/tab2/InitiativeGuide.pdf (Jan. 14, 2009) (noting
that Mississippi citizens can propose changes to the State constitution through the initiative
process).
63. Complaint, Hughes v. Hosemann, No. 251-10-546 (Cir. Ct. 1st Jud. Dist. Hinds
Cnty., Miss. July 6, 2010); see also Hughes v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1260, 1266 (Miss. 2011)
(dismissing Planned Parenthood and the ACLU's complaint, stating "[w]e render judgment,
finally dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and this action without prejudice").
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III. PROBLEM
A. The Problem of Incorrectly Defining Personhood Persists
Defining personhood incorrectly leads to horrific and disastrous
results." Supreme Court decisions that incorrectly define personhood have
historically resulted in blatant racism,6 5  attempted eugenics," and
infanticide.6' American Supreme Court jurisprudence dating from as far
back as 1856 to as recent as 2007 contains many examples of incorrect
conclusions later overturned or discredited.
1. The Dred Scott decision promoted racism, inequality, and
incorrectly defined "person."
In the infamous Dred Scott v. Sanford, the United States Supreme Court
held that African-American persons, "not only slaves, but free persons of
color" were not citizens.6' The Court discussed in detail the importance of
defining "person" within the context of the Constitution.6 ' The issue was
"whether the class of persons described . . . compose a portion of this
people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty.""o The Court
concluded that
they are not, and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that
64. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); see also Joseph F. Fletcher, Four Indicators
of Humanhood-The Enquiry Matures, in ON MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
IN MEDICAL ETHICS 376-80 (Stephen E. Lammers & Allen Verhey eds., Wm. B. Erdmans
Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 1998) (1987); Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. &PUB. AFF.
37-65 (1972).
65. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403-04 (1856).
66. See Buck, 24 U.S. at 207-08 (stating as a justification for human sterilization that
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough").
67. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
68. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 587.
69. Id. at 404-05.
70. Id. at 404.
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time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjugated by the dominant race[.]"
The Court stated that even when African-American slaves became
emancipated, they "remained subject to their authority, and had no rights
or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government
might choose to grant them."72 When one group of elites determines the
definition of personhood incorrectly, monstrous results of slavery, racism,
and genetic favoritism are plausible results.
2. The Buck v. Bell decision promotes genetic favoritism and
incorrectly defines person.
Genetic favoritism and eugenics are most notably associated with Nazi
Germany, but they also found a home in the Commonwealth of Virginia as
was demonstrated by the decision of Buck v. Bell." In Buck v. Bell, Carrie
Buck was raped by her landlord's nephew.74 To cover up the shameful,
premarital pregnancy, her guardians placed her in a colony for the feeble-
minded.7 1 Virginia considered Ms. Buck a "feeble-minded white woman"
and placed her in the "State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded.""
Because the Court assumed she was "the daughter of a feeble-minded
mother" and also "the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child," the
Court concluded that she could be sterilized without consent because she
was considered "the probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring."7 7 Although the Court did not specifically state that Ms. Buck was
not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court did claim that
Virginia's interest in sterilizing her was somehow justified.7 ' The Court
reasoned that the alleged process she went through somehow satisfied
Fourteenth Amendment concerns, thereby treating her as less than a person
with due process rights."
71. Id. at 404-05.
72. Id. at 405.
73. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
74. Carrie Buck Revisited, UNIV. OF VA. HEALTH SYSTEM CLAUDE MOORE HEALTH
SCIENCES LIBRARY, http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/eugenics/5-epilogue.cfm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012).
75. Id.
76. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205.
77. Id. at 205, 207.
78. Id. at 205.
79. Id.
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In Buck v. Bell, the Court permitted the sterilization of some men and
women that the Court defined as "manifestly unfit."so The Court upheld the
statute stating that certain types of men or women are somehow "defective
persons" and seen as a menace to humanity." Furthermore, the Court
concluded that preventing "socially inadequate offspring" was a legitimate
state interest and thereby upheld the selective sexual sterilization of Carrie
Buck.82 Refusing to recognize Carrie Buck as a person led the Court to a
shocking conclusion: "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.""
Such legal conclusions are devoid of liberty and adhere more closely with
the ideology of Nazi Germany than with what should exist in American
legal jurisprudence.
To assist in preventing the horrendous, arbitrary, and capricious
constitutional interpretations reflected in Buck and Dred Scott, one must
define the terms person, persons, or personhood to include all stages of
biological development and not merely those humans considered by some
to be genetically beneficial or socially adequate. It is disingenuous to claim
that our system upholds the supreme law of the land in its command to
"secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity" when the
nation's courts selectively and arbitrarily decide certain individuals'
blessings are not worth protecting.84
3. The Stenberg v. Carhart decision permits infanticide and fails to
correctly define person.
United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia referenced the
Preamble to the Constitution, specifically the protection of ourselves and
our posterity," when he dissented in Stenberg v. Carhart regarding the right
to perform a late-term abortion." Because there are individuals who
advocate the acceptability of late-term abortions, who ignore the reality of
80. Id. at 205, 207.
81. Id. at 205-07.
82. Id. at 207.
83. Id.
84. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
85. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
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its brutality, and who fail to correctly define the term person, a brief
description of the procedure is necessary to illuminate its horrific nature.
The procedure is called "Dilation and Extraction," otherwise known as
D&X, and it is a version of a procedure generally known as "Dilation and
Evacuation," or D&E." In this procedure, the abortionist "uses his fingers
to deliver the opposite lower extremity, then the torso, the shoulders and
the upper extremities" so that the entire baby, except the head, is outside of
the mother's womb." The baby's head "lodges at the internal cervical ....
Usually there is not enough dilation for [the head] to pass through."" While
the baby is faced belly down, the abortionist "slides the fingers of the left
hand along the back of the [baby] and 'hooks' the shoulders ... with the
index and ring fingers (palm down)."o While the abortionist "relies on
cervical entrapment of the head, along with a firm grip," the abortionist
"takes a pair of blunt curved Metzenbaum scissors in the right hand" and
slides the scissors "along the spine and under his middle finger until he feels
it contact the base of the skull."" The abortionist then "forces the [blunt
curved Metzenbaum scissors] into the base of the skull .. . . [H]e [then]
spreads the scissors to enlarge the opening."9 2 A nurse present during one of
these procedures described her observation:
The baby's little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and
his little feet were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in
the back of his head, and the baby's arms jerked out, like a
startle reaction, like a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he
is going to fall.93
After the abortionist pries the baby's skull open, he then sticks "a high-
powered suction tube into the opening, and suck[s] the baby's brains out."
The Court later held in Gonzales v. Carhart that this procedure was not
medically necessary.95 The only difference between this brutal procedure
87. Id. at 924, 927 (majority opinion).
88. Id. at 987-88. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 988 (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (alteration in original).
93. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 138-39 (2007).
94. Id. (alteration in original).
95. Id. at 164.
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and infanticide is a handful of seconds and a few inches of birthing
progression. 6 In fact, both the Stenberg and Gonzales decisions quote a
statute that refers to the unborn baby as a child three times in the same
sentence.97 Regardless of one's personal beliefs, the ability for the Supreme
Court-or any other judicial, executive, or legislative body-to select who is
included in the definition of person for the purposes of constitutional
protection is too great a power to be haphazardly wielded. If the line is not
drawn at the begininning of the existence of human life,98 then it will be
arbitrarily drawn elsewhere.
4. Modern interpretations of personhood.
Modern interpretations of personhood persist in the attempt to define
person to exclude the underprivileged and the defenseless. Three modern
writers provide an overview of current interpretations of personhood.
Joseph Fletcher" gave a modern interpretation of personhood stating that
96. BALLENTINE's LAW DICTIONARY (2010) (defining infanticide as "[tihe killing of a
young child shortly after its birth").
97. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922; Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 151.
98. 42AM.JUR.2DInfants§ 3(2011).
[Bliologically speaking, the life of a human being begins at the moment of
conception in the mother's womb, and as a general rule of construction in law,
a legal personality is imputed to an unborn child for all purposes which are
beneficial to the infant after his or her birth. Under this view, viability does not
affect the legal existence of the unborn, and it would be a most unsatisfactory
criterion, since it is a relative matter, depending on the health of the mother
and child and many other matters in addition to the stage of development.
Id; see also David Polin, Proof of Identification of Substance by Instrumental Analysis, 54 AM.
JUR. Proof of Facts 3d 381, § 19 (originally published in 1999) ("Human genetic information
is encoded in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and is contained in the 23 pairs of chromosomes
found in all body cells that contain nuclei."); Lee M. Silver & Susan Remis Silver, Confused
Heritage and the Absurdity of Genetic Ownership, 11 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 593,618 (1998).
[A] mother deposits just a single copy of DNA for each of the 23 human
chromosomes. A second set of 23 DNA molecules is deposited in this same egg
by the genetic father. The information present in each of these 46 DNA
molecules is then copied over time into 100 million million
(100,000,000,000,000) new sets of DNA molecules that are placed into each new
cell formed during fetal and child development. Each of these new DNA
molecules is built from raw materials that are recovered from the food that the
mother, and then the child, consumes.
Id.
99. Joseph Fletcher was a professor and former Episcopal theologian who taught at the
University of Virginia and Harvard Divinity Schools. He was named Humanist of the Year in
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there are four indicators of humanhood."' One indicator is that "life is a
value to be preserved only insofar as it contains some potentiality for
human relationships."o' Depending on how the court defines the phrase,
"potentiality for human relationships"-or what constitutes a human
relationship for that matter-this definition of personhood could prove
even more disastrous than the depravity revealed in Buck. Fletcher also cites
Michael Tooley,102 who illustrates yet another example of how defining
personhood incorrectly can have disastrous effects.10 3 Michael Tooley wrote
an article in 1972 about defining when a human being deserves a right to
life and, thus, when he or she becomes a person. He stated that
[t]he basic issue to be discussed, then, is what properties a thing
must possess in order to have a serious right to life. My approach
will be to set out and defend a basic moral principle specifying a
condition an organism must satisfy if it is to have a serious right
to life. It will be seen that this condition is not satisfied by human
fetuses and infants, and thus that they do not have a right to life.
So unless there are other substantial objections to abortion and
infanticide, one is forced to conclude that these practices are
morally acceptable ones. In contrast, it may turn out that our
treatment of adult members of other species - cats, dogs, polar
bears - is morally indefensible. For it is quite possible that such
animals do possess properties that endow them with a right to
life.'
1974 by the American Humanist Association. Joseph Fletcher, NNDB,
http://www.nndb.com/people/580/000169073/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
100. Fletcher, supra note 64, at 80.
101. Id. at 377 (citing R. A. McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern
Medicine, 229 JAMA 172-76 (July 8, 1974)).
102. Id. Michael Tooley is a professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado-
Boulder, and his research is primarily in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Moral Philosophy,
Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion. Michael Tooley, UNIV. OF COLO. AT BOULDER,
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/fac-tooley.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
103. Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 37, 37 (1972). One
disastrous effect is concluding that infanticide is a morally acceptable practice. "[U]nless
there are other substantial objections to abortion and infanticide, one is forced to conclude
that these practices are morally acceptable ones." Id.
104. Id.
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Tooley came to the conclusion that a cat or a dog might be found to have a
right to live over a human being in utero.'s Another prolific writer, Ben
Rich,106 attempted to define person as one who has the "capacity for
conscious experience."'o 7 Perhaps these authors would have no moral
objection to the analysis and outcomes of Dred Scott, Buck, and Stenberg.
Such preposterous results continue to surface when the importance of
defining the term person is not understood.
This Comment suggests that, at least originally, there was no need to
enumerate a fundamental right "to exist"-or the right to life for every
human being from the beginning of biological development until natural
death-because it was implicit within the language of the Constitution.
Merely recognizing a pre-existing right in any document is much different
from creating a new right through legal positivism. Some legal theorists
claim that the Constitution's Preamble secures a right to life for our
posterity. 0 8 Focusing solely on the Preamble of the Constitution, one must
recognize the existence of "two classes of people, i.e., 'ourselves' and 'our
Posterity.' . .. 'Posterity,' it is suggested, is difficult to define except in terms
of yet-to-be-born people."1o' Prominent members of the Constitutional
Convention used the term posterity when drafting the Virginia Declaration
of Rights and "proclaimed in its Preamble that the rights declared in the
purview of the instrument do pertain to them (i.e., 'the good people of
Virginia') and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of
government.""'o Moreover, the Virginia Declaration is very specific in
securing a right to life for the unborn:
[All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society,
105. Id.
106. Ben A. Rich is the U.C. Davis School of Medicine Alumni Association Endowed
Chair of Bioethics, and he has written profusely on the bioethics of patient autonomy and
end of life care for the elderly. Professor Ben Rich assumes bioethics endowed chair, UC DAVIS
HEALTH SYSTEM, http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/welcome/features/20070530_benrich/
index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
107. Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Personhood: A Matter of Consciousness, 11 BIOETHICS 206,
206 (1997).
108. Eric M. Axler, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The
Restoration of the People's Unenumerated Rights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 431, 435-37 (2000);
Marcin, supra note 15, at 273, 275-76.
109. Marcin, supra note 15, at 275.
110. Id.at276-77.
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they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity;
namely the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.'
As noted above, Justice Scalia referenced the Preamble when analyzing
the legality of the live-birth abortion procedure.'12 In another example of
the terrible results produced by failing to define the term person correctly,
Justice Scalia refuted the constitutionality of late-term abortions. He stated
that
[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States, designed,
among other things, "to establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility,... and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity," prohibits the States from simply banning this
visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is
quite simply absurd.113
Nevertheless, despite this overwhelming history and Supreme Court dicta
supporting a definition of posterity as a protection of the right to life, the
Supreme Court has failed to recognize the validity and plain language of the
Preamble as a source of inalienable rights.114 When viewed alongside the
numerous founding documents referencing an inalienable right to life, such
as in the Declaration of Independence and various other provisions of the
Constitution, the Preamble substantiates the conclusion that the life and
liberty of our posterity must be protected.
111. Id.at277.
112. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Axler, supra note 108, at 437, 440. Commenting on this very subject, the author
wrote the following:
Despite abundant commentary regarding the utility of the Preamble as a means
of securing and interpreting rights, the Preamble alone, according to the United
States Supreme Court case, Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, is an
insufficient source of such rights.
. . . [T]he Jacobson decision, although handed down ninety-five years ago,
remains conclusive on the issue.
Id. (citation omitted).
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IV. THE SOLUTION OF RECOGNIZING INALIENABLE RIGHTS BY
ENUMERATION: AN ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL RECORDS AND CASE
PRECEDENT
Much is at stake with correctly understanding the Constitution as a
covenant."' Future generations must understand the importance of
adhering to the Constitution as a sacred covenant," 6 and the Posterity
referenced in the Constitution's Preamble is indicative of this
importance."' Great care must be taken when asserting fundamental rights
or liberty interests.18 In light of precedent upholding the right of the
115. "Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to
us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn
anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive
more ages than one." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 901 (1992).
116. Id.
117. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
118. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (considering a Second
Amendment right).
Under our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from an
American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that
guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no means
eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local
needs and values.
Id.; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (considering a right to die)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest,
we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action. We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are
asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the
Members of this Court.
Id.; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
[Tihe District Court . . . then reasoned, based on decisions of this Court
affirming the undeniable importance of education, that there is a fundamental
right to education and that, absent some compelling state justification, the
Texas system could not stand. We are unable to agree that this case, which in
significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the conventional
mosaic of constitutional analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for
the several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect-classification not the
fundamental-interest analysis persuasive.
Id.
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unborn to have standing to sue," 9 acknowledging the right to life of the
unborn, the elderly, or the infirm as protected by the Due Process Clause is
not precluded by stare decisis.120 Moreover, proposals for state personhood
amendments are rapidly increasing.12 ' When the historic and textual
evidence that the Constitution preserves rights for future generations is
compared to recent constitutional interpretation diminishing those
119. See Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 398 (D.C. 1984)
(holding that "having determined that a viable fetus is a person under the common law, it
follows that injury to the fetus resulting in death is actionable under our wrongful death and
survival statutes") (emphasis added); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 535 (W. Va. 1995).
[A] nonviable unborn child who is tortiously injured but, nevertheless, is born
alive may maintain a cause of action. In addition, if death ensues as a result of a
tortiously inflicted injury to a nonviable unborn child, the personal
representative of the deceased may maintain an action pursuant to our
wrongful death statute).
Id.; Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 n.11 (D.D.C 1946) (citations omitted).
By the eighth week the embryo or foetus, as we now call it, is an unmistakable
human being, even though it is still only three-quarters of an inch long....
Indeed, the Chinese have long recognized that when a man is born he is already
nine months old. Each of their babies is given at birth a full year's credit on the
reckoning of its age.
Id.
120. See generally John Edward Davidson, Tomorrow's Standing Today: How the
Equitable Jurisdiction Clause of Article III, Section 2 Confers Standing Upon Future
Generations, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 185 (2003) (arguing for "posterity standing"); see also
Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 88.
121. H. JT. REs. 3,84th Leg. (Iowa 2011).
With respect to the fundamental and inalienable rights of all persons
guaranteed in this constitution, the word "person" applies to all human beings,
irrespective of age, health, function, physical or mental dependency, or method
of reproduction, whether in vivo or in vitro, from the beginning of their
biological development, including the single-cell human embryo.
Id. A South Carolina bill states:
(A) The right to life for each born and preborn human being vests at
fertilization.
(B) The rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution of this
State, that no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws, vest at fertilization
for each born and preborn human person.
S.B. 616, 119th Leg. (S.C. 2011); see also S.R. 71, 25th Leg. (Haw. 2010) (stating, in part, "that
every person, from the beginning of biological development including fertilization, is
provided all the rights and protections as a human being").
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rights,122 the need for federal and state constitutional amendments
reiterating those rights is demonstrated.
A. The Pre-Constitutional Recognition of a Right to Life
To accurately ascertain the right to life bestowed on all persons before
and after the Constitution, it is necessary to examine important historical
documents that reference the right, namely, the Bible, the Declaration of
Independence, 2 3 and the Constitution.124
These foundational, historical documents, and the founding fathers
responsible for creating the latter two, demonstrate the way society viewed
the right to life during the years immediately preceding the ratification of
the Constitution.
1. Before the Constitution
a. The Bible
One of the most commonly used historical references in American legal
writing is the Holy Bible.125 Several biblical references identify the need to
hold human life in the highest regard. For instance, the Bible states that
God created man and woman "in his own image"126 and commands them to
"be fruitful and multiply."'27 The Bible refers to a Holy God as the One who
knits together humankind in the womb and even the One who saw the
unformed body before development."' When speaking about the prophet
122. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973) (establishing constitutional right to
abortion); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
846 (1992) (confirming Roe); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (declaring
partial-birth abortion ban unconstitutional). But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007) (finding partial-birth ban constitutional).
123. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
124. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
125. See Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 776-83 (9th Cir. 2007) (determining that a juror's
notes regarding Bible verses supporting or opposing capital punishment did not have a
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"); People v.
Roybal, 966 P.2d 521, 544-45 (Cal. 1998) (determining that a prosecutor's discussion of
biblical authority did not require reversal); People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1134-36 (Cal.
1993) (noting that when the prosecutor referenced the Bible, the court did "not find the
prosecutor's remarks here to be prejudicial").
126. Genesis 1:27 (King James).
127. Genesis 1:27-28.
128. Psalm 139:13-16.
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Jeremiah, the Bible says that even before God formed Jeremiah in the
womb, He knew Jeremiah and appointed him as a prophet. 129
b. Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Bracton
Founding Western legal theorists relied heavily on the Bible. For
example, Sir William Blackstone in his famous Commentaries on the Laws
of England, which played a primary role in Western legal thought, described
God's law as immutable.o Moreover, Blackstone claimed that any law
contrary to God's law was not valid.131 Another important historical legal
theorist was Lord Henry De Bracton. 132 Lord Bracton was appointed to the
advisory council of Henry III of England, was known as the "Father of the
Common Law," and is credited with developing the idea of criminal
intent.' 3 Additionally, Bracton was considered the "last great ecclesiastical
jurist."1 34 He wrote his treatise On the Law of England, which linked the
development of justice from Greece and Rome to English jurisprudence.13 1
As an ecclesiastical jurist, Bracton considered Scripture indispensable to the
foundation of law.
129. Jeremiah 1:5.
130. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 27 (W.E.
Dean, 1832) (stating that the laws laid down by God are "the eternal immutable laws of good
and evil .... ).
131. Id. ("This law of nature dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation
to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws
are of any validity if contrary to this . . .. ").
132. Walter A. Bordenn, MD, A History of Justice: Origins of Law and Psychiatry, 24 AM.
ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 12-14 (Apr. 1999).
133. Michael Edmond O'Neil, Stalking the Mark of Cain, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 31, 40
(2001).
Henry Bracton, fittingly a cleric as well as a judge, served as the American Law
Institute of his day in producing a treatise that became both an immensely
influential argument for what the law should be as well as a restatement of what
it was at the time in which he wrote. With respect to mens rea, Bracton argued,
"[iut is will and purpose which mark maleficia" and "a crime is not committed
unless the intention to injure exists." This focus on intent as a necessary
predicate for establishing criminal liability carries over from Bracton's time to
the present day.
Id. (citation omitted).
134. Walter A. Bordenn, A history of justice: origins of law and psychiatry, 24 AAPL
NEWSLETTER 12 (Apr. 1999).
135. O'Neil, supra note 133.
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American leaders most frequently consulted the author Baron Charles
Secondat de Montesquieu during the formation of the Constitution (1760-
1805).136 History credits Montesquieu with the important concept of
separation of powers.137 When speaking of the relationship that the
Christian Bible and religion should have with government, Montesquieu
said that "[t] he Christian Religion, which ordains that men should love each
other, would without doubt have every nation blest with the best civil, the
best political laws; because these, next to this religion, are the greatest good
that men can give and receive."138 Like Montesquieu, many Founding
Fathers relied heavily on Scripture.13 1
Sir William Blackstone was the second most consulted authority during
the Founding Fathers' Era.140 Blackstone's Commentaries was the primary
legal treatise in the United States.'41 James Madison stated: "I very
cheerfully express my approbation of the proposed edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries."'42 United States Supreme Court Justice James Iredell,
appointed by George Washington, said that "[f]or near thirty years it
[Blackstone's Commentaries] has been the manual of almost every student
of law in the United States, and its uncommon excellence has also
introduced it into the libraries, and often to the favorite reading of private
gentleman."'43
Blackstone, Montesquieu, Lord Bracton, and the Bible were instrumental
in the development of Western legal thought and the founding documents
of America. To correctly ascertain the right to life bestowed on all persons
before and after the Constitution, it is necessary to examine important
historical documents that reference this right. In particular, Blackstone was
also quoted in the founding document of America-the Declaration of
Independence."
136. BARTON,supra note 10, at 214.
137. Id. at 214-15.
138. Id. at 214.
139. Id. at 226.
140. Id. at 216.
141. Id. at 217 (noting that Blackstone's "Commentaries became the major foundation for
the American system of jurisprudence").
142. Id. at 216.
143. Id. at 217.
144. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("the separate and equal
station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them . . . .").
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c. The Declaration of Independence
The text of the Declaration seems clear.'4 ' The phrase "to secure these
rights, governments are instituted" outlines the purpose of instituting a
government: to secure inalienable rights, among which is the right to life. "
The importance of this central purpose cannot be stressed enough. When
people argue about the definition of life, they are in essence arguing about
the purpose of government. Regardless of what ideological side one claims,
the need to define the right to life and the persons to whom that right
extends is paramount. To explain the purpose of mentioning life in the
Declaration, one must look at both who created the document and the
sources referenced in the document. The reference to the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God includes Common Law and Blackstone's expression of
it.
The laws of nature are observable laws in nature; the Law of Nature's
God is the written word, the Bible.' Indeed, the two primary sources of
Natural Law are the laws of nature and the Laws of Nature's God. Samuel
Adams said, "In the supposed state of nature, all men are equally bound by
the laws of nature, or to speak more properly, the laws of the Creator.""'
John Quincy Adams opined that "the laws of nature and of nature's God ...
of course presupposes the existence of a God, the moral ruler of the
universe, and a rule of right and wrong, of just and unjust, binding upon
145. Id. at paras. 1-2.
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to
assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which
the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them ... .We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men ....
Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. BARTON, supra note 10, at 216-17.
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his
Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being .... And consequently, as man
depends absolutely upon his Maker for every thing, it is necessary that he
should in all points conform to his Maker's will. This will of his Maker is called
the law of nature ....
Id.
148. Id. at 230.
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man, preceding all institutions of human society and of government.""'
Natural Law legal theorists Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Locke heavily
influenced the Founders. References to the authority of the Bible and
Christianity as the bases for Common Law are sprinkled throughout
judicial opinions.'s As Justice Story remarked, "There never has been a
period of history in which the Common Law did not recognize Christianity
as lying at its foundation.""' The Common Law is intertwined with
American history and jurisprudence.
The Declaration recognizes a pre-existing inalienable right to life, 2
albeit forgotten in today's jurisprudence. Principles, such as the inalienable
right to life, were meant to establish the foundation on which the
Constitution was to operate.13 Therefore, protecting the inalienable right to
life through the constitutional covenant is essential to effect its intended
operation.
2. The Constitution
The Constitution references the right to life four times, although not as
explicitly as it is stated in the Declaration.5 4 The Constitution references
the Declaration of Independence when it states "in the Year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven" and "of the Independence of the
United States of America the Twelfth.""' Moreover, not only do several of
the Founding Fathers date their government acts from the Declaration
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892);
Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
151. William Graves, Evolution, the Supreme Court, and the Destruction of Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 513, 535 n.157 (2001).
152. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
153. BARTON, supra note 10, at 250
[T]he virtue which had been infused into the Constitution of the United
States ... was no other than the concretion of those abstract principles which
had been first proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence.... This was the
platform upon which the Constitution of the United States had been erected. Its
virtues, its republican character, consisted in its conformity to the principles
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence and as its administration ...
was to depend upon the . . . virtue, or in other words, of those principles
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the
Constitution of the United States.
Id. (quoting John Quincy Adams in his oration, "The Jubilee of the Constitution").
154. U.S. CONST. amend. V (twice); amend XIV, § 1.
155. U.S. CONsT. art. VII.
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rather than the Constitution,' 6 but several enabling acts granted by
Congress for various states do also." All this is to say that correctly
interpreting the Constitution requires one to read the Constitution in
156. BARTON, supra note 10, at 248-49 (emphasis added).
Given under my hand and the seal of the United States, in the city of New
York, the 14th day of August, A.D. 1790, and in the fifteenth year of the
Sovereignty and Independence of the United States. By the President: GEORGE
WASHINGTON
In testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the United States to be affixed
to these presents, and signed the same with my hand. Done at Philadelphia, the
22nd day of July, A.D. 1797, and of the Independence of the United States the
twenty-second. By the President: JOHN ADAMS
In testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the United States to be
hereunto affixed, and signed the same with my hand. Done at the city of
Washington, the 16th day of July, A.D. 1803, and in the twenty-eighth year of
the Independence of the United States. By the President: THOMAS JEFFERSON
Given under my hand and the seal of the United States at the city of
Washington, the 9th day of August, A.D. 1809, and of the Independence of the
said United States the thirty-fourth. By the President: JAMES MADISON
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, this 28th day of April, A.D.
1818, and of the Independence of the United States the forty-second. By the
President: JAMES MONROE
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, this 17th day of March,
A.D.1827, and the fifty-first year of the Independence of the United States. By the
President: JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, this 11th day of May, A.D.
1829, and the fifty-third of the Independence of the United States. By the
President: ANDREW JACKSON.
Id.
157. Id. at 249.
[T]he constitution, when formed, shall be republican, and not repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of
Independence. COLORADO
[Tihe constitution, when formed, shall be republican, and not repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of
Independence. NEVADA
The Constitution, when formed, shall be republican, and not repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of
Independence. NEBRASKA
The constitution shall be republican in form. . .[sic] and shall not be
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the
Declaration ofIndependence. OKLAHOMA
Id. (emphasis added).
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conjunction with the Declaration to fully understand the principles and
rights contained therein, especially the inalienable right to life.
Defining the term person or persons in the Constitution is a modern
debate and is the focus of this Comment. Nevertheless, even the first
Supreme Court Chief Justice considered the rights and protections of the
Constitution to pertain to "[e]very member of the State" and not just
constitutional persons."15  Daniel Webster also placed a focus on the
importance of upholding the Constitution as a responsibility of our unborn
"posterity."' The need to clearly define and enumerate the pre-existing
right to life for all persons at any stage of biological development until
natural death is now more apparent than ever in America. Americans
should heed the 1803 warning of reverend Matthias Burnet:
Finally, ye ... whose high prerogative it is, to .. . invest with
office and authority, or to withhold them, and in whose power it
is to save or destroy your country, consider well the important
trust ... which God .. . [has] put into your hands. To God and
posterity you are accountable for them . . .. Let not your children
have reason to curse you for giving up those rights, and
prostrating those institutions which our fathers delivered to
you ... .160
158. 1 JOHN JAY, THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, JAY'S CHARGE TO
THE GRAND JURY OF ULSTER COUNTY 1 (G. P. Putnam's Sons 1890) (1763-1781) ("Every
member of the State ought diligently to read and to study the constitution of his country ....
By knowing their rights, they will sooner perceive when they are violated, and be the better
prepared to defend and assert them.") (emphasis omitted).
159. 13 DANIEL WEBSTER, THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 492-93
(Little, Brown, & Co. 1903) (1852).
[I]f we and our posterity reject religious instruction and authority, violate the
rules of eternal justice, trifle with the injunctions of morality, and recklessly
destroy the political constitution which holds us together, no man can tell how
sudden a catastrophe may overwhelm us that shall bury all our glory in
profound obscurity.
Id. (emphasis added).
160. Matthias Burnet, Pastor of the First Church in Norwalk, An Election Sermon (May
12, 1803) in DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION
350 (4th ed. 2005) (emphasis added).
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B. Constitutional Interpretations that Diminish Inalienable Rights
Facially, the Constitution and the Declaration uphold the inalienable
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Supreme Court,
however, has eroded and diminished all three of these inalienable rights by
failing to recognize the Constitution as a covenant among the people and by
failing to consider the Declaration's principles. Additionally, the series of
Supreme Court decisions on the subject of abortion are almost
incomprehensible in application due to the different standards posited and
varying outcomes, and they leave one at a loss for a consistent approach to
dealing with unborn personhood.16' For instance, H.L. v. Mathesonl62
161. See, e.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71 (1971) ("There remains the
contention that the word 'health' is so imprecise and has so uncertain a meaning that it fails
to inform a defendant of the charge against him and therefore the statute offends the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. We hold that it does not.") (citations omitted). This
decision recognized the ambiguous "health" exception, yet upheld the criminal abortion
statute. Id. at 70-72; see also AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2008: PROVEN
STRATEGIES FOR A PRO-LIFE AMERICA 43-48 (Americans United for Life, 2008) (2006) (citing
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
of 2003, effectively throwing out Stenberg and restoring Casey-type deference to state
legislation, basically rejecting a requirement for an unlimited health exception, and paving
the way for states of have more strict "informed consent" laws, recognizing the detrimental
effects on women); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (reversing court
decision that invalidated New Hampshire's parental notice law and remanding for future
consideration); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking Nebraska's ban on partial-
birth abortion and the partial-birth abortion prohibitions of twenty-nine other states,
concluding that statutory terms were unconstitutionally vague, and also invalidating for lack
of a "health" exception); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (upholding Montana's
parental notice statute on the "assumption that a judicial-bypass procedure requiring a
minor to show that parental notification is not in her best interests is equivalent to a judicial
bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that abortion without notification is in her best
interests"); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding Montana's
statute restricting performance of abortions to licensed physicians only); Fargo Women's
Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (insisting that Casey
invalidates laws that are a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo abortion);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming
the central holding of Roe v. Wade that, prior to viability, a woman's right to abortion
cannot be restricted, but a plurality of three justices abandoned the strict scrutiny standard of
review applied to fundamental rights for a new "undue burden" standard, and five justices
voted to strike down spousal notice requirement); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(upholding federal regulations prohibiting personnel at family planning clinics that receive
Title X funds from counseling or referring women regarding abortion); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (invalidating a Minnesota law requiring a two-parent
notification without a procedure for judicial bypass, but upholding two-parent notification
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that included judicial waiver, and a forty-eight hour waiting period for minors); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Akron II) (upholding an Ohio statute
that required minor to notify one parent or obtain judicial waiver, and rejecting clinic's claim
that judicial procedure was burdensome); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (upholding a Missouri statute that prohibited use of public facilities or public
personnel to perform abortions and required ultrasound tests to determine viability of
unborn child in pregnancies of twenty weeks or more); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating provisions of a
Pennsylvania statute that required informed consent from physicians on fetal development
and medical risks of abortion, reporting requirements, requiring a physician to use the
method of abortion most likely to preserve the life of a viable unborn child, and requiring
attendance of a second physician at post-viability abortions); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Akron I) (invalidating the informed consent provisions
of city ordinance requiring: (1) physicians to give patients information on medical risks of
abortion, (2) a twenty-four hour waiting period, (3) that all abortions after the first trimester
be performed in a hospital, (4) parental consent for minors seeking abortions with no
judicial bypass, and (5) that physicians dispose of fetal remains in a "humane and sanitary
manner"); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983)
(invalidating a Missouri statute that required second trimester abortions to be performed in
a hospital, but upholding requirements that a second physician be in attendance during a
post-viability abortion, that a minor obtain parental consent or judicial waiver, and a
pathology report be made for each abortion); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983)
(noting that Virginia's definition of "hospital" included outpatient clinics and holding that
its requirement was a reasonable means of furthering the state's compelling interest, but the
Court affirmed the conviction of a doctor for unlawfully performing an abortion during the
second trimester of pregnancy outside of a licensed hospital); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981) (upholding a Utah statute requiring a physician to notify a minor's parent before
performing abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the Hyde
Amendment, which restricts federal funding of Medicaid abortions only to cases of life
endangerment and rape or incest, reasoning that government could distinguish between
abortion and other medical procedures because "no other procedure involves the purposeful
termination of potential life"); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (upholding an Illinois
statute prohibiting the use of state funds for abortions except where necessary to save the
woman's life); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II) (invalidating a Massachusetts
law that required minors to obtain consent of both parents before obtaining an abortion and
requiring states with similar consent requirements to afford minors an alternative
opportunity for abortion authorization via judicial bypass); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379
(1979) (striking as vague a Pennsylvania statute that required physicians to use abortion
technique providing the best opportunity for the child to be born alive in abortions after
viability); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (upholding a Pennsylvania statute that restricted
the use of Medicaid funds for abortion to those that are "medically necessary"); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut prohibition on the use of public funds for
abortions, except those that are "medically necessary"); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)
(upholding a St. Louis policy against performing abortions in public hospitals); Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I) (holding that the district court should have abstained
from deciding the constitutionality of a Massachusetts parental consent statute until the state
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upheld a Utah statute requiring a physician to notify a minor's parent
before performing an abortion."' Such parental notifications are on point
with much of the previous Supreme Court precedent, but Bellotti v. BairdIC
(Bellotti II) invalidated a Massachusetts law requiring a minor to obtain
parental consent."'s In another case, the Court upheld portions of a
Missouri statute requiring a second physician to be present during post-
viability abortions,'6 but three years later, the Court invalidated a
Pennsylvania statute requiring, inter alia, the attendance of a second
physician during post-viability abortions.66 Additionally, the Court
invalidated a city ordinance that required a twenty-four hour waiting period
for a woman who sought an abortion,16" but in a separate case upheld a
court had interpreted the statute); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976) (upholding the definition of "viability" under a state statute and a
requirement that women sign a consent form prior to abortion but invalidating spousal
consent, parental consent for minors, a prohibition on use of saline amniocentesis, and a
requirement for those performing abortions to exercise professional skill and care to
preserve the life of the unborn child); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (holding that
physicians may challenge abortion-funding restrictions on behalf of female patients seeking
abortions, thereby permitting abortion providers to challenge state laws as plaintiffs in place
of individual patients); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) ( invalidating the application
of a Virginia statute that prohibited the advertisement of abortion); Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9 (1975) (upholding a Connecticut anti-abortion statute as it applied to non-
physicians); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking Texas's criminal abortion statute,
prohibiting abortion except where necessary to preserve maternal life, and declaring for the
first time a "right to privacy" in the Due Process Clause includes the right to abortion); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (invalidating Georgia's abortion "reform" statute that
authorized abortion only where continued pregnancy would endanger a woman's life or
health, including mental health, where the unborn child would likely be born with a serious
defect or where pregnancy resulted from rape).
162. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412 ("The Utah statute is reasonably calculated to protect
minors in appellant's class by enhancing the potential for parental consultation concerning a
decision that has potentially traumatic and permanent consequences."); see also Ayotte, 546
U.S. at 323 (reversing the lower court decision invalidating New Hampshire's parental notice
law in its entirety and remanding for the lower court to determine whether it could devise a
narrower remedy than a permanent injunction).
163. Id. at 331.
164. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 651 ("Although [the statute] satisfies constitutional standards
in large part, [it] falls short of them. . .
165. Id.
166. Planned Parenthood Ass'n ofKansas City, Mo., 462 U.S. at 476.
167. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747.
168. City ofAkron, 462 U.S. at 416.
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forty-eight hour waiting period for minors. 169 The Court has also upheld
part of a Pennsylvania statute requiring a twenty-four hour mandatory
reflection period following the receipt of risk information.170
Moreover, the standard of review the Court applies continues to change
with its wavering position. For instance, in Simopoulos v. Virginia, the
Court held that Virginia's requirements were constitutional as a "reasonable
means" of furthering the state's "compelling interest" in protecting the
health and safety of women." Generally, the Court applies three levels of
scrutiny (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and a rational basis test).'72
The specifics of each level of scrutiny are outside the purview of this
Comment; however, it is unclear whether "reasonable means" and
"compelling interest" constitute strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, a
rational basis test, or some new hybrid. In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, however, the plurality abandoned what
had evidently been the standard-strict scrutiny-and applied a new
"undue burden" standard of review.17 1 Yet, in a subsequent decision, Justice
O'Connor stated in a concurring opinion that the proper Casey analysis is
whether, "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion."1 74 Whether the current standard is a "substantial obstacle,"
"undue burden," or a "reasonable means" of furthering a state's "compelling
interest" is unknown and determining whether one of these standards is
currently applicable is disappointingly unpredictable.
Historically, the Supreme Court has decided cases involving inalienable
rights in a way inimical to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.17 ' In
Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court upheld a violation of the right to life of an
infant, striking down a ban on partial-birth abortion in which a distinct,
individual, human child is born, but the child's head is kept partially in the
169. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
170. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
171. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
172. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (recognizing "the
traditionally expressed levels [of scrutiny] (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational
basis)").
173. AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 161, at 47 (citing Casey).
174. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
175. See generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (considering a partial-birth
abortion statute); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (considering a forced sterilization and
eugenics statute); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (considering slavery).
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vagina for the purpose of shoving scissors into the skull and extracting the
infant's brains."' Additionally, in Buck v. Bell, the Court upheld a violation
of liberty against mentally challenged individuals, referring to them as
"imbeciles" and justifying their sterilization."' Moreover, in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, African-American persons were denied recognintion as citizens
under the Constitution.178
To interpret the Constitution without viewing it as a covenant among the
people and in light of the Declaration of Independence erodes, confuses,
and diminishes a person's inalienable rights. The necessity of understanding
the Constitution as the covenant among the people that it was intended to
be, and viewing the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration's
principles, continues to grow. Thus, perhaps the time has come to
enumerate the pre-existing inalienable right to life through a federal
constitutional amendment and similar state amendments.
1. Standing to Sue
Case precedent upholds the right of the unborn to have standing to
sue, 79 and a personhood amendment vesting due process rights in the
unborn is not an unforeseeable conclusion.' In Greater Southeast
176. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914 (discussing dilation and evacuation (D&E) and dilation
and extraction (D&X) abortion procedures).
177. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (stating that "[tlhree generations of imbeciles are enough" as a
justification for sterilization).
178. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403-05.
179. See Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1984) (holding
that "(1) viable fetus is a 'person' under the common law with the right to be free of nonfatal
tortious injury, and (2) viable fetus is also a 'person' within meaning of wrongful death and
survival statutes and, hence, fatal prenatal injury to otherwise viable fetus is actionable under
those statutes"); see also Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that "(1)
tortious injury suffered by nonviable child en ventre sa mere who subsequently is born alive
is compensable and no less meritorious than injury inflicted on viable child who is
subsequently born alive, and (2) term 'person' as used in wrongful death statutes
encompasses nonviable unborn child, and cause of action for tortious death of such child is
permitted"); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 n.11 (D.D.C. 1946) (stating, in part, that
"[b]y the eighth week the embryo or fetus, as we now call it, is an unmistakable human
being, even though it is still only three-quarters of an inch long. Indeed, the Chinese have
long recognized that when a man is born he is already nine months old. Each of their babies
is given at birth a full year's credit on the reckoning of its age.") (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
180. See Davidson, supra note 120, at 185 (positing the Stewardship Doctrine as a
constitutional theory of intergenerational justice); Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 88
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Community Hospital v. Williams, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that a viable unborn child is a person under the common law
and has the right to be free from tortious injury."' Additionally, the Court
found that a viable unborn child is a person under the wrongful death
statutes, and therefore, prenatal injury was actionable.'8 2 In Farley v. Sartin,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals went further, holding that
tortious injury on a nonviable child was no less meritorious than injury on a
viable child."' The Court also held that the term person in the wrongful
death statutes included a nonviable unborn child. 8 4
The definition of a person as applied to unborn children is not foreign to
American courts. It is a non sequitur that an unborn child has standing to
bring a cause of action for tortious injury, but somehow does not have the
inalienable right to live. Indeed, defining an unborn child as a person is
therefore a foreseeable constitutional protection. Some argue such a
protection should at least begin with state constitutional amendments,
mainly citing principles of dual federalism. An argument could be made
that the current Supreme Court may be returning to such federalist
principles. In fact, in 2011, the Supreme Court upheld this idea of
federalism when it struck down a criminal statute for violating the Tenth
Amendment.15 Perhaps it is permissible under federal law for states to
enact through constitutional amendment a more expansive protection of
persons under the state law. If this were to take effect, another issue may
arise in finding prosecutors willing to uphold such a law.'86
(discussing whether the unborn child injured by its mother's employer possesses a worker's
compensation claim or an action in tort).
181. Williams, 482 A.2d at 394.
182. Id.
183. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 522.
184. Id.
185. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011).
Just as it is appropriate for an individual, in a proper case, to invoke separation-
of-powers or checks-and-balances constraints, so too may a litigant, in a proper
case, challenge a law as enacted in contravention of constitutional principles of
federalism. That claim need not depend on the vicarious assertion of a State's
constitutional interests, even if a State's constitutional interests are also
implicated.
Id.
186. For a tragic example of the adversity prosecutors may face when challenging the
status quo of Roe and its progeny, see PLANNED PARENTHOOD CORRUPTION, Timeline of
Events http://plannedparenthoodcorruption.org/timeline/ (last viewed Mar. 3, 2012).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Historical records, case precedent, and constitutional federalism
demonstrate a need to protect the inalienable right to life through a federal
constitutional amendment and similar state amendments. In the case of
abortion, a moral evil of great magnitude is committed against two
persons-the child and the mother. A personhood amendment is a
principled and defensible response to the onslaught of abortion-on-demand
that tears apart the lives of women and children. Our founding documents,
along with the horrific judicial attempts at defining the term person,
illustrate that a personhood amendment is both foreseeable and necessary.
Such an amendment would reaffirm the Supreme Court's recent insistence
on upholding federalism, and the basic inalienable human right to life for
the most susceptible to attack-the defenseless unborn. It is a sad day in
America when the most dangerous place for any human is inside a mother's
womb. A Supreme Court decision on a state personhood constitutional
amendment could answer the question of whether the Federal Government
can dictate state constitutional definitions, and more specifically, whether
the Supreme Court is willing to recognize the inalienable right to life from
the beginning of biological development until natural death.
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